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Abstract 
Evaluative conditioning (EC) is sometimes portrayed as a primitive way of changing attitudes 
that is fundamentally different from persuasion via arguments. We provide a new perspective 
on the nature of EC and its relation to persuasion by exploring the idea that stimulus pairings 
can function as a symbol that conveys the nature of the relation between stimuli. We put 
forward the concept of symbolic EC to refer to changes in liking that occur because stimulus 
pairings function as symbols. The idea of symbolic EC is consistent with at least some current 
theories of persuasion. It clarifies what EC research can add to the understanding of the origins 
of our preferences and has implications for how (symbolic and non-symbolic) EC can be 
established, the boundaries of EC research, and cognitive and functional models of EC.  
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Evaluative conditioning as a symbolic phenomenon:  
On the relation between evaluative conditioning, evaluative conditioning via instructions, 
and persuasion 
For many years now, researchers have been intrigued by the impact that stimulus 
pairings seem to have on liking (Martin & Levy, 1978; Razran, 1954; see De Houwer, Thomas, 
& Baeyens, 2001, and Hofmann, De Houwer, Perugini, Baeyens, & Crombez, 2010, for 
reviews). This phenomenon, which is typically referred to as evaluative conditioning (EC), 
promises to provide a unique contribution to evaluative learning research, that is, research on 
how likes and dislikes are acquired and can be changed. Acquiring knowledge about the origins 
of preferences is considered to be a core mission for psychology as a whole because 
preferences are assumed to guide many aspects of human behavior. 
Within the realm of evaluative learning research, EC is often seen as fundamentally 
different from persuasion via arguments. Whereas the latter requires effortful processing of 
words and sentences, EC is assumed to be a “primitive means of changing attitudes” (Briñol, 
Petty, & McCaslin, 2009, p. 287) that requires little cognitive effort and thought. In this paper, 
we offer a different perspective on EC that highlights the symbolic nature of this phenomenon. 
More specifically, we argue that the spatio-temporal pairing of stimuli can function as a symbol 
indicating how those stimuli are related, much like words and sentences can. Such instances of 
EC are similar to persuasion via arguments in that both phenomena depend on the ability to use 
symbols. They are different primarily with regard to the proximal event that functions as a 
symbol (i.e., stimulus pairings or a collections of words or sentences).  
In the second part of this paper, we discuss a number of implications of this point of 
view. First, it reveals that EC research can shed light on a unique symbolic way of influencing 
liking (i.e., via stimulus pairings). Second, we discuss the implications for how the presence of 
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(symbolic and non-symbolic) EC can be established. Third, we explore the boundaries of EC 
research. Finally, we examine the implications for cognitive and functional accounts of EC.  In 
sum, the central message of this paper is that EC is a symbolic phenomenon that shares 
important properties with other symbolic phenomena such as persuasion via verbal arguments 
but that also has unique features and thus offers a unique way to change preferences. 
Communalities between EC, EC via Instructions, and Persuasion 
EC via Instructions 
We start our analysis with a recently documented phenomenon known as EC via 
instructions. It refers to the fact that merely informing participants about a relation between a 
neutral stimulus and a valenced stimulus is sufficient to change liking, even when those stimuli 
are never actually presented together. For instance, after reading the sentences “UDIBNON 
will be followed by positive pictures” and “BAYRAM will be followed by negative pictures”, 
participants like UDIBNON more than BAYRAM, irrespective of whether liking is assessed 
using direct measurement procedures (e.g., evaluative ratings) or indirect measurement 
procedures (e.g., the Implicit Association Test; see De Houwer, 2006; Gast & De Houwer, 
2013).  
As noted by Gast, Gawronski, and De Houwer (2012), there has been a debate about 
whether EC via instructions qualifies as EC, that is, as changes in liking that are due to stimulus 
pairings (De Houwer, 2007). Some have argued that it does (e.g., Gast et al., 2012; see Field, 
2006, for a similar argument in the context of fear conditioning via instructions). It seems 
indisputable that the presentation of instructions is a spatio-temporal event: it involves the 
presence of physical stimuli such as letters or sounds in a particular space and a particular 
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period of time.1 Because instructions typically involve multiple stimuli, one could even say 
that instructions involve a pairing of stimuli, be it that each pair of stimuli typically occurs only 
once in a single instruction (see De Houwer, Barnes-Holmes, & Moors, 2013, for a discussion 
of what constitutes a pairing or, more generally, a regularity in the environment). Structurally 
speaking, when the instruction involves both neutral and valenced stimuli (e.g., “UDIBNON 
will be followed by positive stimuli”), one could argue that there is a pairing of a neutral (i.e., 
UDIBNON) and a valenced stimulus (e.g., “positive”) that could in principle lead to a 
subsequent change in how the neutral stimulus is evaluated. Hence, one could argue that EC 
via instructions is an instance of EC.  
On the other hand, it seems overly simplistic to argue that instructions have an effect 
because of their mere spatio-temporal properties, that is, merely because it consists of stimuli 
that co-occur in space and time (also see De Houwer et al., 2013, pp. 639-640). In all 
likelihood, instructions have an impact on liking because of the symbolic meaning of those 
instructions, more specifically, what the instructions imply about the nature of the relation 
between the stimuli. For instance, it seems reasonable to assume that an instruction such as 
“UDIBNON will be followed by positive pictures” has an effect on liking not simply because 
“UDIBNON” and “positive” co-occur in the same sentence but because, for an English 
speaker, the instruction specifies that “UDIBNON” and “positive” are related in a specific 
manner (i.e., the UDIBNON will precede the presentation of positive pictures). Hence, one 
could argue that the name “EC via instructions” is inappropriate in that the change in liking 
does not qualify as an instance of EC.2 More importantly for the present purposes, these 
                                                 
1 Hence, “learning via instructions” and “learning via direct experience” should not be contrasted. Receiving 
instructions is a physical event that is experienced directly.  
2 One might argue that the role of symbolic meaning in EC via instructions is restricted to the interpretation of 
individual words. Understanding the symbolic meaning of a word (i.e., to understand what the word stands for) 
merely alters the nature of the individual stimulus (e.g., it changes the stimulus “positive” from a string of letters 
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arguments imply that EC via instructions is an essentially symbolic phenomenon. Participants 
derive symbolic meaning from a particular proximal event (i.e., an event that occurs here and 
now in space and time), being the words and sentences of which the instructions are composed. 
They can do so because they have the capacity to use symbols.  
EC as a Symbolic Phenomenon 
Now that we have established that EC via instructions is a symbolic phenomenon, we 
examine whether standard EC might also qualify as a symbolic phenomenon. When examining 
this question, it is important to realize that once people have learned to use symbols, they can 
apply this ability not only to proximal stimuli such as words or sentences but also to stimulus 
pairings (also see Gast et al., 2012). Virtually any proximal event can function as a symbol, that 
is, something that stands for something else. For instance, in sign language, gestures function 
in much the same way as words or phrases. Under the right conditions, even a simple wink of 
the eye can convey as much symbolic meaning as an entire sentence. In more technical terms, a 
range of proximal events can function as symbols on the basis of which meaning is constructed. 
The fact that humans use symbols in such a flexible and ubiquitous manner has led to the 
proposal that humans are essentially symbolic beings (Deacon, 1997). 
In line with this idea, we argue that the pairing of stimuli is one of those proximal 
events that can convey symbolic meaning. More specifically, we propose that the pairing of 
stimuli can change liking because it symbolizes that the stimuli are related in a certain way. For 
                                                                                                                                                        
into a positive stimulus). Hence, EC via instruction might still be regarded as the effect of the mere proximal 
pairing of individual stimuli, be it symbolically interpreted stimuli. Although we do not exclude this possibility on 
an a priori basis, it is important to realize that an instruction goes beyond the meaning of the individual words in 
that it involves some type of relation between the concepts referred to by the individual words. In fact, if such an 
overarching meaning is absent, the instruction would merely be a list of unrelated words that would not constitute 
what is commonly labeled an instruction. Note that we do not claim that the change in valence must be a logical 
consequence of the instruction. For instance, there is no logical reason that UDIBNON is good because it precedes 
positive pictures. In that sense, the change in liking is irrational. Nevertheless, regardless of whether the change in 
liking is rational or irrational, it is likely to depend on the symbolic meaning of the instruction as a whole rather 
than on the symbolic meaning of the individual words as such. 
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instance, the spatio-temporal co-occurrence of a neutral stimulus and a valenced stimulus 
might be taken to indicate that the two stimuli are similar. In this case, stimulus pairings 
function in much the same way as the expression “is similar to” in the instruction “A is similar 
to B”, that is, they symbolize that the two stimuli share certain properties. As is the case with 
words and other proximal events that function as symbols, the meaning that is conveyed by 
stimulus pairings is not entirely fixed. Depending on the context, stimulus pairings might even 
symbolize different types of relations (e.g., similarity, opposition, hierarchy). We refer to an 
instance of EC as symbolic EC when the change in liking is due to the fact that the stimulus 
pairings function as a symbol for the relation between the stimuli.3 
Many before us have pointed out that human and nonhuman animals often (if not 
always) respond on the basis of how they construct their environment (i.e., the meaning that 
they attribute to their environment) rather than to the physical environment itself (e.g., Bruner 
& Goodman, 1947). Our claims fit within this general constructivist approach but are novel in 
that they focus on a specific type of meaning construction (i.e., symbolic meaning 
construction) that is applied to a specific type of proximal event (i.e., stimulus pairings). Note 
that meaning construction can also be non-symbolic, for instance, when stimuli function as 
signals. Signals differ from symbols in that they do not stand for something else but merely 
announce future events or trigger future actions in a dynamic or causal manner (Levi, 2007). 
Interestingly, it has been argued that only humans can use symbols (e.g., Deacon, 1997). This 
would imply that only humans who have developed the ability to use symbols can display 
symbolic EC. Also note that we do not commit to any specific theory about the development of, 
                                                 
3 One could argue the EC qualifies as symbolic also when the individual stimuli function as symbols (e.g., words 
that denote neutral or valenced concepts) but the spatio-temporal pairing does not. In this paper, however, we aim 
to highlight the fact that stimulus pairings can function as a symbol and to examine the implications of this idea. 
Therefore, we restrict our definition of symbolic EC to those instances of EC in which stimulus pairings function 
as symbols.  
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or mental processes underlying, the ability to use symbols. For instance, our arguments do not 
depend on whether this ability is mediated by propositional representations. Our arguments are 
thus situated at a very abstract level of analysis and do not have to be tied down to existing 
theoretical debates. By operating at a high level of abstraction, we hope to obtain new insights 
and reach consensus that might not be achievable when operating at the level of specific 
theories about learning and liking. We will return to this issue near the end of the paper.  
Symbolic EC and Persuasion 
In those cases where stimulus pairings function as symbols, EC has a lot in common 
with persuasion via arguments. Both phenomena depend on the use of symbols. Although the 
two phenomena involve different types of proximal events as symbols (stimulus pairings 
versus words or sentences), they are both symbolic in nature. This perspective contrasts with 
the widespread view that EC is fundamentally different from persuasion via arguments. For 
instance, within the Elaboration-Likelihood Model (e.g., Petty & Cacioppo, 1986), EC is seen 
as a primitive process that is part of the peripheral route of attitude change. This peripheral 
route is assumed to operate separately from a central route that is responsible for the processing 
of arguments. In contrast to the Elaboration-Likelihood model, we argue that stimulus pairings 
function in much the same way as arguments: the effect of both types of proximal events 
depend on the symbolic meaning that is constructed on the basis of those events.  
From the perspective of the Heuristic-Systematic Model (Chaiken, Liberman, & Eagly, 
1989), one might argue that stimulus pairings can function as heuristic cues. Such cues can lead 
to attitude change via “simple rules of inference linking elements of the persuasion setting 
(heuristic cues) with evaluative inferences” (Bohner, 2008, p. 167). It is not unreasonable to 
assume that that people have heuristic rules that link stimulus parings to valence (e.g., “stimuli 
that co-occur, are similar in valence” or “stimuli that are similar with regard to their 
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spatio-temporal presence are likely to be similar also in valence”). These heuristic rules are not 
logically sound or always correct, but in some situations, people might turn to them (either 
intentionally or unintentionally) as shortcuts for determining the evaluative properties of 
objects. Provided that the application these heuristic rules (at least sometimes) involves 
treating the stimulus pairings as a symbolic event, one could argue that the 
Heuristic-Systematic Model of persuasion is compatible with the idea the stimulus pairings can 
function as symbols. In fact, we believe that some symbolic instances of EC might well be 
mediated by the application of these types of heuristic rules.  
Finally, the idea of symbolic EC is compatible also with the unimodel of persuasion 
(e.g., Kruglanski & Thompson, 1999). As noted by Bohner (2008, p. 172), the unimodel 
postulates that “persuasive evidence can be presented in an unlimited number of forms and 
variations”, including forms that do not involve words or sentences. Hence, even events such as 
stimulus pairings might function as persuasive evidence in much the same way as words and 
sentences do. Whereas the Heuristic-Systematic Model puts forward a heuristic mode of 
processing that is separated from a more effortful systematic mode of processing, the unimodel 
retains only one mode of processing that is called upon by all persuasive evidence. As an idea 
that is situated at a high level of abstraction, symbolic EC is agnostic about the type and 
number of processes on which it is based. The main point that we want to make in this section 
is that symbolic EC is closely related to persuasion and compatible with several current theories of 
persuasion. As far as we know, EC has never before been linked to persuasion in this manner, 
perhaps because EC has typically been thought of as a primitive, non-symbolic phenomenon. 
Implications 
 In the second section of this paper, we discuss the implications of our analysis for a 
number of important questions in EC research. First, we try to shed new light on the question of 
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why EC research is important. Second, we explore ways to establish the presence of (symbolic 
and non-symbolic) EC. Third, we discuss the boundaries of EC research. Finally, we briefly 
explore the implications of our ideas for mental and functional theories of EC. 
What is the added value of EC research? 
The idea that EC is a symbolic phenomenon could be perceived as a threat for EC 
research. Because it points to an important communality between EC and persuasion, it raises 
the question of what EC research can offer that cannot be learned from research on persuasion 
via arguments. Some might argue that the only hope for the survival of EC research is that at 
least some instances of EC do not depend on the ability to use symbols. In these cases of 
non-symbolic EC, stimulus pairings would function as a mere proximal cause of changes in 
liking, that is, as a proximal cause whose impact is does not depend on the ability to use 
symbols. If it is indeed the case that certain instances of EC are non-symbolic, then studying 
these instances could offer insights in the origins of preferences that cannot be gained from 
studying the effects of persuasive arguments on liking. 
This brings us to the second central point of our paper (the first one being that many if 
not all instances of EC are symbolic in nature). We believe that EC research can offer more 
than the hope of uncovering non-symbolic instances of EC. The idea that many if not all 
instances of EC are symbolic offers new opportunities for EC research. All instances of 
symbolic meaning construction involve a proximal event on the basis of which meaning is 
constructed. Importantly, the consequences of symbolic meaning construction for changes in 
liking might depend on the nature of the proximal event. For instance, stimulus pairings might 
have different effects on liking than sentences that describe the relation between stimuli, even 
when the effect of both types of proximal events depends on the ability to use symbols. 
Because of its focus on stimulus pairings as a source of liking, EC research can provide unique 
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information about the way in which symbolic meaning construction on the basis of stimulus 
pairings gives rise to changes in liking. In this way, EC research contributes in a unique way to 
our understanding of how likes and dislikes are acquired and how they can be changed. 
From this angle, the importance of EC research depends on the extent to which the 
properties of changes in liking vary as a function of the nature of the proximal event that gives 
rise to symbolic meaning construction. Ultimately, whether and how the nature of the proximal 
event matters in this respect can be determined only via empirical research. Nevertheless, there 
are reasons to believe that it might matter. For instance, a persuasive message such as “Bob is a 
great guy” could sometimes lead to reactance. That is, people might dislike Bob because they 
feel coerced into liking Bob. Instead, simply pairing Bob with positive pictures could lead to 
interpretations of the situation that people are less likely to experience as imposed upon them 
because they are self-generated (e.g., “ a picture of Bob predicts positive images”) but that 
might still influence their preferences in subtle, perhaps even irrational ways. In fact, it would 
be interesting to examine whether symbolic EC depends on factors that are known to influence 
persuasion via arguments (e.g., information about the intentions of the experimenter). 
Regardless of the merit of this specific argument, it seems worthwhile to at least consider the 
possibility that stimulus pairings provide a unique way of conveying meaning and thus a 
unique way of influencing liking. EC research can document this potentially unique route to 
liking and can thus contribute in a unique way to evaluative learning research.  
In sum, EC research is potentially interesting not only because it might reveal a 
primitive, non-symbolic way of influencing liking but also because it might reveal a unique 
symbolic way of influencing liking.  
How to establish the presence of (symbolic and non-symbolic) EC?  
In order to realize this potential, EC researchers need to be able to determine when EC 
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has taken place and, preferably, when such an instance of EC qualifies as symbolic or 
non-symbolic. We believe that the definition of EC as put forward by De Houwer (2007) 
remains useful to achieve this goal. De Houwer (2007) argued that EC is best conceived of an 
effect, that is, as the impact of stimulus pairings on liking. The central point of the present 
paper is that, at an abstract level of analysis, stimulus pairings could influence liking because of 
two distinct functions that stimulus pairing can have. First, they can be a mere proximal cause 
of changes in liking. This is the case when the impact of the pairings merely depends on their 
spatio-temporal properties. Second, stimulus pairings can have an effect because they are 
interpreted as a symbol for the relation between the stimuli, something that can happen only in 
organisms that are able to treat proximal events as symbols.4 However, regardless of whether a 
specific instance of EC qualifies as symbolic or non-symbolic, in order to establish the 
presence of EC, evidence is required that the observed change in liking is due to stimulus 
pairings rather than other proximal events. Once such evidence has been provided, one can try 
to determine whether that instance of EC qualifies as symbolic or non-symbolic. 
Establishing stimulus pairings as a cause of changes in liking can be achieved by 
manipulating those pairings while eliminating or controlling for other potential proximal 
events such the repeated presentation of one stimulus, relations between responses and stimuli, 
and the presentation of other stimuli such as words or sentences that can give rise to meaning 
construction (see De Houwer, 2007; De Houwer, 2011). First, it is relatively easy to control for 
the impact of stimulus frequency on liking (i.e., mere exposure effects; see Bornstein, 1989, for 
a review). For instance, one could vary on a within subjects basis whether a stimulus is paired 
with a positive or a negative event while keeping the number of stimulus presentations 
                                                 
4 In principle, stimulus pairings could function also in other ways, for instance, as a signal. For the sake of 
simplicity, we will not elaborate on this possibility and focus on whether stimulus pairings do (as in symbolic EC) 
or do not (as in non-symbolic EC) function as symbols. 
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constant. Second, effects of response-outcome relations can be eliminated by adhering to a 
strict Pavlovian procedure in which the presence of events is under the control of the 
experimenter. Third, one can eliminate meaning construction on the basis of words or 
sentences by not including such stimuli. Given that most studies on EC do eliminate or control 
for all these alternative proximal causes or cues in this way, it seems safe to conclude that EC 
research can document the ways in which stimulus pairings influence liking. 
It seems less straightforward, however, to demonstrate the stimulus pairings do not 
function as a symbol. First, one cannot simply exclude symbolic meaning construction as a 
factor in EC by verifying the absence of stimuli such as words or instructions. As we noted 
earlier, symbolic meaning can be constructed on the basis of a wide variety of proximal events, 
including the fact that two stimuli co-occur in space and time. Second, inferring the absence of 
symbolic meaning construction from the absence of evidence for this type of meaning 
construction can also be problematic. As is always the case when trying to demonstrate the 
absence of something, one could argue that the absence of evidence is due to a failure to use 
appropriate tests (i.e., test that are sufficiently valid, comprehensive, and sensitive). Given 
these problems, we foresee a difficult and lengthy debate about whether EC can be found in the 
absence of symbolic meaning construction. 
On the other hand, we believe that it should be possible to establish that stimulus 
pairings do function as a symbol. One approach is to keep constant the spatio-temporal 
properties of the pairings while varying the symbolic meaning that can be constructed on the 
basis of those pairings. Consider the work of Zanon, De Houwer, and Gast (2012) who paired a 
first compound of two stimuli (AB) with a positive outcome and a second compound of two 
other neutral stimuli (CD) with a negative outcome. These target pairings were intermixed with 
filler trials during which other stimuli were paired with the positive or the negative outcome. 
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Importantly, the filler trials were constructed in line with one of two rules. The first rule 
stipulated that a stimulus is always followed by the same (positive or negative) outcome 
regardless of whether it is presented on its own (e.g., K-positive; L-positive; M-negative; 
N-negative) or in compound with another stimulus (e.g., KL-positive; MN-negative). The 
second rule specified that the same stimulus is followed by a different outcome depending on 
whether it is presented on its own (e.g., K-positive; L-positive; M-negative; N-negative) or in 
compound with another stimulus (e.g., KL-negative; MN-positive). Even though the filler 
trials do not change the spatio-temporal properties of the target pairings (AB-positive; 
CD-negative) in any way, they could change the symbolic meaning of those pairings. 
According to the first rule, observing a target pairing points at an unambiguous relation 
between stimuli and outcomes (i.e., a particular stimulus will always be followed either by a 
positive or a negative event; e.g., AB-positive implies that A on its own will also be followed 
by the positive outcome). According to the second rule, however, the target pairings imply that 
stimuli and outcomes are related in a more complex manner (i.e., the same stimulus is followed 
by a different event depending on whether it is presented alone or in combination with another 
stimulus; e.g., AB-positive implies that A on its own will be followed by the negative 
outcome). Results revealed a standard EC effect for the target stimuli (e.g., A more positive 
than C) but only when the filler trials followed the first rule. The moderating impact of the filler 
trials cannot be due to changes in the spatio-temporal properties of the target pairings 
(AB-positive; CD-negative) simply because these properties were kept constant. The filler 
trials could, however, have influenced the symbolic meaning that the stimulus pairings 
conveyed about the nature of the relation between the stimuli and outcomes. 
A similar approach can be used to test whether proximal events other than stimulus 
pairings give rise to symbolic meaning construction. That is, one could manipulate the 
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symbolic meaning of the events while keeping the spatio-temporal properties of the stimulus 
pairings constant. Consider the instruction “Bob loves kittens”. The role of the word “loves” 
can be examined by replacing it with another similarly valenced word such as “flower” that 
does not imply the same relation between Bob and kittens. One could also change the position 
of the word “loves” so that its relational function is altered (e.g., “loves Bob kittens”). If these 
manipulations moderate the change in liking, it seems safe to conclude that the change in liking 
is not merely a function of the spatio-temporal co-occurrence of words (i.e., the fact that “Bob” 
and “kittens” appear in the same sentence) but depends on the symbolic meaning of the words, 
that is, on what the word “loves” implies about the relation between “Bob” and “kittens”. 5 
What are the boundaries of EC research? 
As noted in the previous section, we believe it should be possible to determine whether 
stimulus pairings influence liking (which establishes the presence of EC), whether they do so 
by functioning as symbols (which establishes the presence of symbolic EC), and whether 
proximal events other than stimulus pairings function as symbols. In this section, we consider 
more complex situations in which multiple proximal events interact in producing changes in 
liking. Although such changes in liking raise questions about the exact boundaries between 
different evaluative learning phenomenon, we argue that they do not call in to question the 
view that EC research is directed at understanding the effects of stimulus pairings on learning 
(De Houwer, 2007). 
Let us consider the work of Zanon, De Houwer, Gast, and Smith (2014) who not only 
paired stimuli repeatedly but also provided instructions about the relational implications of the 
stimulus pairings (for related studies, see Fiedler & Unkelbach, 2011; Gast & De Houwer, 
                                                 
5 Note that the absence of an effect of these manipulations does not demonstrate that the change in liking is due to 
mere spatio-temporal stimulus pairings. Such a conclusion would require the assumption the manipulations 
provide a valid, comprehensive, and sensitive test of symbolic meaning construction on the basis of cues other 
than stimulus pairings. 
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2012; Moran & Bar-Anan, 2013; Peters & Gawronski, 2011). All participants experienced a 
learning phase during which one non-word (e.g., LOKANTA) was paired repeatedly with a 
well-known positive word (HAPPY) whereas another non-word (e.g., FEVKANI) repeatedly 
co-occurred with a well-known negative word (SAD). Half of the participants were informed 
either before or after the stimulus pairings that a non-word had the same meaning as the word it 
was paired with (i.e., synonym condition) whereas the other participants were told that paired 
stimuli had an opposite meaning (i.e., antonym condition). Afterwards, (implicit) evaluations 
of the non-words were in line with the valence of the word they were paired but only when the 
paired stimuli were described as synonyms. When the antonym instructions were provided 
before the stimulus pairings, (implicit) evaluations of the non-words were even opposite to the 
valence of the word with which they were paired.  
The results of Zanon et al. (2014) clearly reveal an impact of the relational meaning 
implied by the instructions (i.e., whether paired stimuli were said to be synonyms or 
antonyms). Because a proximal event other than stimulus pairings determined the changes in 
liking, one could argue that the observed effects do not qualify as instances of EC. On the other 
hand, the instructions of Zanon et al. did not directly specify the relation between stimuli but 
merely provided information about the relational implications of stimulus pairings. That is, the 
instructions did not specify whether two particular stimuli were synonyms or antonyms (e.g., 
“LOKANTA is a synonym of HAPPY”) but only whether paired stimuli were synonyms or 
antonyms. As such, the changes in liking could be attributed to the symbolic meaning 
constructed on the basis of stimulus pairings (e.g., “the fact that LOKANTA is paired with 
HAPPY implies that it is a synonym of HAPPY”). The instructions merely changed the 
relational implications of the stimulus pairings. If one would define EC as all changes in liking 
that are due to stimulus pairings (i.e.., impact of stimulus pairings as a sufficient inclusion 
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criterion) rather than as changes in liking that are exclusively due to stimulus pairings as a 
proximal cause (i.e., impact of other proximal events as a sufficient exclusion criterion), then 
the effects observed by Zanon et al. would qualify as instances of EC. Hence, in some cases 
where the effects of stimulus pairings interact with those of other proximal events, it might be 
difficult to decide whether observed changes in liking qualify as instances of EC. In the case of 
the effects observed by Zanon et al., the uncertainty follows from the fact that there is no 
consensus yet about whether stimulus pairings must be the only source of changes in liking 
(i.e., stimulus pairings as an exclusive cause) in order to say that the change in liking qualifies 
as an instance of EC. 
Fortunately, definitions do not have to be entirely coherent or decisive in order to be 
useful. More generally, scientific definitions are not true or false, they are just tools that are 
there to help researchers to organize their work and their understanding of the world. From this 
perspective, it does not matter that much whether it is always perfectly clear when a definition 
applies. For instance, defining EC as the impact of stimulus pairings on liking continues to 
provide a very useful demarcation of EC research even when there continue to be debates about 
whether some changes in liking are instances of EC. Regardless of the outcome of these 
debates, effects such as those of Zanon et al. (2014) that focus on the way stimulus pairings 
interact with other proximal events to produce changes in liking most certainly help us to 
understand EC, that is, the way in which stimulus pairings influence preferences.  
Even when a particular effect does not qualify as an instance of EC, it might still help us 
understand EC. Considered instances of so-called EC via instructions. Instructions about 
stimulus pairings provide a unique subclass of instructions because they refer to the proximal 
event that is the focus of EC research (i.e., stimulus pairings). Studying the similarities and 
differences between EC and the effects of instructions about stimulus pairings could thus 
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provide important information about the processes underlying both phenomena. Moreover, it 
could constitute a unique avenue for documenting the added value of experiencing stimulus 
pairings as compared to being merely instructed about the pairings (see Raes, De Houwer, De 
Schryver, Brass, & Kalisch, 2014, for research on this topic in the context of fear conditioning). 
The merit of these contributions does not depend on what effects qualify as “true” instances of 
EC. As long as there is agreement about the fact that the mission of EC research is to study the 
effect of stimulus pairings on preferences (De Houwer, 2007), all phenomena that can increase 
our understanding of the impact of stimulus parings on liking should be of interest to EC 
researchers, regardless of whether all of these phenomena are called EC.  
What are the implications for cognitive and functional theories of EC? 
 In recent years, EC research has been dominated by the debate between association 
formation theories and propositional theories of EC. In essence, association formation models 
postulate that stimulus pairings set in motion a mental mechanism that, more or less 
automatically, forms associations between representations in memory (see Hofmann et al., 
2010, for a review of these models). During the last decade, alternative theories were 
formulated according to which EC is mediated by the formation of propositional 
representations (De Houwer, 2014; Mitchell, De Houwer, & Lovibond, 2009). Unlike 
associations, propositions are statements about the world that can specify different ways in 
which stimuli are related (e.g., A predicts B, A causes B). Unlike association formation, the 
formation of propositions is thought to be a relatively non-automatic processes.  
During the analysis that we presented in this paper, we intentionally did not refer to this 
debate. Instead, we used abstract terms such as “symbolic meaning construction” that were not 
phrased in terms of associations and propositions. We deliberately opted for this approach 
because we believe that our analysis is situated at a higher level of analysis than the debate 
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between associative and propositional theories (see De Houwer & Moors, 2015). On the one 
hand, the idea that stimulus pairings can function as symbols fits better with propositional 
models of EC than with existing association formation models of EC because the relational 
nature of symbols (i.e., something that stands for something else) seems to require 
representations that can encode relational information (i.e., propositions). On the other hand, 
we do not want to exclude the possibility that symbol use can somehow be explained on the 
basis of the principle of association formation. Association formation models that can account 
for the use of stimulus pairings as symbols would compete with proposition formation models 
in explaining symbolic EC. Importantly, however, such association formation would not 
question the fact that stimulus pairings can function as symbols in EC. We therefore hope that 
our arguments and ideas about the symbolic nature of EC will survive the current debate 
between propositional and associative theories of EC and that researches might reach 
consensus over the existence of symbolic EC even when they would not agree about whether 
symbolic EC is mediated by associative or propositional processes. 
 In a recent paper, Hughes, De Houwer, and Barnes-Holmes (in press) pointed out that 
EC cannot only be studied from a cognitive perspective but also from a functional-analytic 
perspective. Without going into too much detail, functional-analytic explanations aim to 
understand behavior in terms of behavioral principles, that is, general ways in which events in 
the environment influence behavior. Within this approach, Hughes et al. argued that instances 
of EC might qualify as instances of a functional phenomenon known as Arbitrarily Applicable 
Relational Responding (AARR). In simple terms, AARR refers to patterns of behaviors that 
can be described as “acting as if” stimuli are related (see Hughes et al., in press, and Hughes & 
Barnes-Holmes, 2016a, 2016b). EC would qualify as an instance of AARR if the pairing of 
stimuli functions as a cue for people to act as if the paired stimuli are related with regard to their 
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valence. According to Relational Frame Theory (Hayes, Barnes-Holmes, & Roche, 2001), 
AARR depends not only on proximal events such as stimulus pairings but also on events in the 
past (i.e., distal events) that gave rise to symbolic behavior. This brief description already 
clarifies that there are many parallels between the analysis that we provided in our paper and 
the argument that (some instances of) EC might qualify as instances of AARR. Research on 
AARR could thus provide direction to research on understanding symbolic instances of EC. 
However, during our analysis, we did not explicitly refer to AARR or Relational Frame Theory 
because we believe that our arguments remain valid even if there would not be a perfect fit 
between EC and AARR or if the ideas put forward in RFT might not stand the test of time. 
Hence, also at the functional-analytic level, we hope that our arguments about the symbolic 
nature of EC will survive future developments in research on AARR and RFT.   
Conclusion 
 We put forward the idea that EC is a symbolic phenomenon. It implies that stimulus 
pairings change liking because they function as symbols for the nature of the relation between 
stimuli. Rather than seeing this idea as a threat to EC research, we believe that it highlights new 
ways in which the study of EC could contribute to evaluative learning research. More 
specifically, EC studies could reveal how symbolic meaning that is constructed on the basis of 
stimulus pairings gives rise to changes in liking. Our analysis also has implications for how 
(symbolic and non-symbolic) EC can be established and is consistent with the idea that the 
mission of EC research is to elucidate the impact of stimulus pairings on liking. It is related to 
current cognitive and functional models but supersedes debates at that level, thus increasing the 
chances of consensus amongst research.  
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 As a final note, we would like to point out that our analysis reveals that symbolic 
abilities are not a nuisance factor when trying to understand EC.6 Instead, the fact that humans 
are symbolic beings should be a crucial factor in EC research. Once human beings have 
acquired the ability to use symbols, why would they not make maximal use of this of this 
ability for making sense of their environment? Why would only words or sentences function as 
symbols? All kinds of events in the environment can function as symbols, including the pairing 
of stimuli. Given human propensity to constantly construct symbolic meaning on the basis of 
all kinds of proximal events, we would not be surprised that symbolic instances of EC are the 
rule rather than the exception. Of course, there is still merit in looking for non-symbolic 
instances of EC. Knowledge about these instances of EC would unique insights in the origins 
of our likes and dislikes and a unique tool for influencing those likes and dislikes. But we can 
also learn a lot from symbolic instances of EC. By putting symbolic EC effects on the agenda, 
we hope to stimulate future EC research and to maintain EC as an important topic in 
psychology.  
  
                                                 
6 We thank Dermot Barnes-Holmes for pitching this idea during one of our many stimulating discussions. 
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